Mr. Chairman,
My delegation has heard most attentively the statements made thus for. The
task of defining the concept or motion of aggression is indeed a
gargantuan one. We have to face this delicate issue in a spirit of
fallibility and caution. Sir Francis Bacon began his essay “Of Truth” by
saying, “What is truth? Said jesting Pilate, and would not stay for an
answer”. If Pontius Pilate were confronted with the task facing this
Committee, I seriously doubt if the Roman governor would even ask the
question.
At its 368th plenary meeting on January 31, 1952, the General
Assembly adopted resolution 599 (VI), which states, inter
alia,
“Considering that, although the
existence of the crime of aggression may be inferred from the
circumstances peculiar to each particular case it is nevertheless possible
and desirable, with a view to ensuring international peace and security
and to developing International Criminal Law to define aggression by
reference to the elements which constitute it.”
This resolution establishes
three conclusions:
(a) that aggression is a crime:
(b) that the existence of this crime
can be inferred from the circumstances peculiar to each particular case
without specifically defining the crime of aggression;
(c) that, notwithstanding this, it
is possible and desirable to and to develop international criminal
law.
And with this end in view, the question of defining aggression was
considered thoroughly at various levels all known to this Committee.
However, it is pertinent to observe that the first wave of enthusiasm
envisaged in the passage of resolution 599 (VI) was considerably mellowed
and dented on a fuller analysis; so that the General Assembly was
constrained to take cognizance of the innate catena of complexities by
adopting, at its 408th plenary meeting, another resolution,
being resolution 688(VII), which stipulate inter
alia.
“Considering that
the discussion of the question of defining aggression at the sixth and
seventh session of the General Assembly and in the International Law
Commission has revealed the complexity of this question and the need for a
detailed study of:
(a) the various forms of
aggression;
(b) the connection between a
definition of aggression and the maintenance of international peace and
security;
(c) the problems raised by the
inclusion of a definition of aggression in the Code of Offences against
the Peace and Security of Mankind and by its application within the
framework of international criminal jurisdiction;
(d) the effect of a definition
of aggression on the exercise of the jurisdiction of the various organs of
the United Nations;
Considering that continued and joint efforts shall be made to formulate a
generally acceptable definition of aggression, with a view to promoting
international peace and security and developing international law, decides
to establish a Special Committee of fifteen members and requests the said
Special Committee;
(a) to submit to the General
Assembly at its ninth session draft definitions of aggression
or draft statements of the notion of
aggression;
(b) to study all the problems
referred to above on the assumption of a definition being adopted by a
resolution of the General Assembly.”
The concentrated research apparently revealed insurmountable difficulties
necessitating the adoption of this second resolution. The first resolution
was emphatic in tone and intent. It assumed that a definition of
aggression would ipso facto ensure international peace and
security. The second resolution was more in step with realities of the
international situation, in that it sought the exact connection between
the definition of aggression and the maintenance of international peace
and security. And, therefore, in view of the doubts engendered, the
General Assembly requested the first Special Committee to enquire even
further into the question.
The deliberations of the first Special Committee necessitated the
formation of another Special Committee to co-ordinate the views expressed
by state members and to submit to the eleventh session of the General
Assembly:
1. a
detailed report; and
2. a draft
definition of aggression.
Among the two proposals submitted for a working plan of the second
Special Committee, the Netherlands proposal suggested inter alia,
“To determine whether or not the outcome of these discussions
warrants the drafting of a definition of aggression and, in case the
answer is the affirmative, to draft a definition of aggression.”
This abundantly indicates that even at so late a stage of study,
skepticism was apparent in the minds of some of the delegates on whether a
definition of aggression was warranted.
It is, therefore, erroneous in my delegation’s view to submit that the
General Assembly’s resolution 599(VI) of January 31, 1952, has irrevocably
settled that it is both possible and desirable to define aggression. If
that were so the General Assembly would not have formed the Special
Committee to consider this case and all its attendant implications at
specialized levels. Indeed, the entire raison deter of creating the
Special Committees would have become vitiated.
The report of the Special Committee on the question of defining aggression
states that about twenty-six representatives considered a definition both
possible and desirable but out of this category some representatives
declared that they supported the adoption of a “generally acceptable
definition” which, in fact, may be interpreted to mean that they opposed
the idea of defining aggression, because “a generally acceptable
definition” could not be found at the present time. Moreover, even these
twenty-six representatives did not form what the report calls “a
homogeneous group”. They differed in opinion as to the function, the
content, and the form of a definition. In order words, they were
classified into one group solely on the ground that they agreed in
principle to a principle, which carries the art of nebulousness to its
apogee.
All this obviously shows that it is fundamentally wrong to hold that the
resolution of the General Assembly of January 31, 1952, or any other
resolution of that body on the subject has prejudiced the issue to the
point where it can be pre-supposed that a definition of aggression is
possible and desirable.
In this context, a resolution of the general Assembly is not an
irrevocable and an unalterable edict. It is not a judgment of a court of
last resort. Hence my delegation firmly believes it is not ultra vires of this discussion to consider if a definition of aggression is both
possible and desirable.
Before entering into the substance of the issue, please allow me, Mr.
Chairman, Sir, to conclude, so to speak, my obiter dictal by saying
that the most salutary aspect of this discussion is that the “End” or
“Objective” of all gathered here is identical. That end is, if I may be
permitted to take a slight liberty with the wording of the preamble, to
save succeeding generations from the scourge of aggression. All are
sedulously seeking to find lasting guarantees for the insurance of
perpetual peace. This factor is of considerable significance. It
establishes an indissoluble link. This spirit and unity of purpose may
well be the most important single factor in the achievement of our
aspiration.
On the first day of this debate, the distinguished and eminent
Representative of Belgium referred to the miraculous achievements of
modern science and fell, if I am correct, that this phenomenal progress is
evidence of the undesirable fact that homo sapiens can attain his
objectives if he labors tenaciously and industriously to that end; and
that it is imperative to keep our social sciences in rhythm with the
development of world movements; else, our concepts and institutions will
face the danger of becoming effete. This is true, but it is a double edged
argument. If modern man can launch a sputnik, to use the terminology of
the successor, into outer space, he can also define aggression. However,
if man’s ingenuity is limitless and if his resources and capabilities know
no frontiers; then he is, and indeed must be ingenious enough not only to
define aggression but also to circumvent, subvert, and abuse it. A
definition, under these circumstances, would literally mean the
presentation of our civilization on a uranium platter to a would-be
aggressor, to a twentieth century Gengis Khan or Attila; a would-be world
dictator who would most certainly find the means to distort and mutilate
the definition for his own wicked and gruesome ambitions.
Let us now examine, if under the present state of International Law’s
development, it is possible to define aggression. International Law has
made tremendous strides since the far flung days of the ancient Greek City
States era, and even since the relatively more recent time of Hugo
Grotius, From a primitive law, dependent mainly on the sanction of
self-help, it has developed into a body of recognized norms. It has
institutionalized itself, and at Nuremburg, it asserted itself to that
pitch of centralization which made it possible for it to take sanctions
against individuals. Nonetheless, in comparison with the highly
centralized and galvanized municipal law, it is still in its infancy. It
does not have the force monopoly of the international community to enforce
effectively all its sanctions. Its efficacy is entirely depended upon the
caprice of national sovereignty. In 1935, a decade before the auspicious
gathering at San Francisco, that celebrated jurist Hans Kelsen
characterized the status of International Law in words which, despite the
substantial progress since achieved, to this day remains essentially the
same; he said:
“The present state of international law is characterized by the
fact that international common law –considered from a technical standpoint
–is still in the stage of a primitive system of law, that is to say, it is
at a stage from which the legal system of the individual States originally
developed. This is a condition of extensive decentralization. There are
not –as in a technically developed system of law –central organisms
dividing among themselves the functions of making and executing law. The
general rules valid for the whole community have not been consciously laid
down by a legislator in an exact and regulated procedure, but –as in the
beginning of the development of law within the individual State –they have
been evolved by custom, that is to say, by the practice of the persons
concerned with that law –the members of the community.
“Within the framework of international common law there are no
central tribunals whose business it is to apply general rules of law to
particular cases. A State inured by another State is the one to decide
whether a violation of international law has taken place, and if the other
State denies the breach which is imputed to it, there is, under
international common law, no objective procedure by which the dispute can
be determined. Thus the State whose rights are impugned itself retaliates
at its own discretion for the wrong perpetrated, in its opinion, with the
measures of coercion peculiar to international law, war or
reprisal.”
I hasten to admit that since 1935, International Law has developed by
leaps and hounds. However this notwithstanding, International Law, in
marked contradistinction to municipal law, is still decentralized law, and
the dichotomy between the two laws is enormous. I am aware of the
International Court of Justice’s existence but also of the subjective
reservations of the states accepting its jurisdiction. I am aware of the
existence of the Security Council and of its primary responsibility for
the maintenance of peace and security, but I am also aware of article
27(3) of the Charter, an article that looms over all matters of
consequence.
My delegation deeply respects the Charter of the United Nations. However,
my delegation believes that no disrespect is shown or intended to this
august organization if reality is mirrored accurately. Here, my delegation
is fortified by the erudite statement of the Foreign Secretary of the
United Kingdom who, during the course of his brilliant speech on September
24, 1957, in the General Assembly said, and I quote:
“This debate is an appropriate opportunity for frank discussion of
the state of the Organization –its achievements, its failures, its
strength, its weaknesses, its standing in the world, the hopes for its
development in the future.
“The United Nations is not a super-state. It is not a world
authority enforcing its law upon the nations. The General Assembly is not
a parliament of individually elected members legislating for the world.
The United Nations is an instrument of negotiation between Governments. It
can blunt the edges of conflict between nations. It can serve diplomacy of
reconciliation. Its tendency is to wear away or break down differences and
thus help towards solutions. In the Secretary-General’s view, the real
limitations upon the actions of the Organization do not derive from the
provisions of the Character or from the system of one vote for one nation
irrespective of strength or size. They result from the facts of
international life at the present time. The balance of forces in the world
sets the limits within which the power of the world organization can
develop.”
These words represent reality so completely that even the most devout
worshipper of the United Nations must accept them. For, to conceal such
self-evident truth is to do an irredeemable disservice to the United
Nations and the cause for which it stands.
There is no escape from the fact that International Law at the present
moment bows at the altar of national sovereignty. Indeed the Charter
itself is a political instrument. It is inevitable, therefore, that any
discussion on the question of the definition of aggression must revolve
around both political and legal issues, that is, on met juristic
considerations, on factors contaminated by the virus of subjective value
judgment. In isolation, and on its own, the attempt to define aggression
is, from a pragmatic standpoint, utterly futile.
It is an axiomatic fact that this endeavor cannot possibly be detached
from socio-political influences. It gets inevitably recoiled in the web of
politics. In these circumstances, are we to have two definitions of
aggression, one political, and the other juridical? One based on the
foundation of thermo-nuclear strength and the other, an analytical and
objective definition, poised rather uncomfortably on the fragile edifice
of an international legal tribunal functioning on the sufferance of
national sovereignty? If that were to be permitted it would achieve for
almost all times the ascendancy of politics over law. It would gravely
endanger International Laws’ struggle for the realization of its autonomy
to enable it to establish permanent international peace through the rule
of law; a system we cherish so dearly. Time and again, men of goodwill
have solemnly appealed to sovereign states to submit their legal disputes
to the International Court of Justice; but in spite of such pleadings, w
find states resorting to other measures in the determination of disputes.
In the present circumstances, such conduct is not really a matter for
alarm or surprise. The Charter itself places the primary responsibility
for the maintenance of international peace and security on a political
organ of the United Nations. By virtue of article 94 (2) it places the
International Court of Justice under the domain of politics. Article 94(2)
states:
“If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent
upon it under a judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may
have recourse to the Security Council, which may, if it deems necessary,
make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to
the judgment.”
In support of my submission I would like to quote from Hans Kelsen’s
monumental treatise on the law of the United Nations:
“The Statute does not contain a provision guaranteeing the
execution of the decision of the Court against a recalcitrant State.
Article 94(2) does not impose upon the Security Council the obligation to
enforce the judgments of the Court against recalcitrant parties. It
provides for a procedure of appeal in case of non-compliance with the
judgment of the Court and makes the action of the Security Council to be
taken as the result of the procedure dependent upon the council’s
discretion by authorizing this body to chose between two different
actions: Either to make recommendations or to decide upon measures to be
taken to give effect to the judgment of the court. In case the Security
Council chooses to make recommendations, it may recommend to comply with
the judgment of the Court. But, in making a recommendation under Article
94(2), the Security Council is not bound to conform with the judgment of
the Court with which the party concerned did not comply. The Security
Council may recommend a solution of the dispute totally different from
that decided by the Court. If Article 25 of the Charter is interpreted to
apply to recommendations of the Security Council, recourse to the Security
Council under Article 94(2) has the effect of an appeal to a higher
authority. Even if it is assumed that recommendations made by the Security
Council are not binding upon the parties, a recourse under Article 94(2)
may have the effect of an appeal. For the Council may consider
non-compliance with a recommendation made under Article 94(2), a threat to
the peace and take enforcement action under Article 39 against the State
which does not comply with the Council’s recommendation. That means that
the Security Council may enforce its recommendation instead d of enforcing
the Court’s judgment. Article 94(2) confers upon the Security Council the
power to substitute its recommendation for the Court’s judgment. This
means further, that the obligation imposed upon the Members by Article
94(1) and by the Statute of the Court: to comply with the decisions of the
Court, may be restricted by application of Article 94(2). By having
recourse to the Security Council under Article 94(2), the party places the
Court under the control of the Council. Since under the Charter self-help
(except in the case of an armed attack as self-defense is prohibited,
non-compliance with the Court’s judgment may compel the other party to
have recourse to the Security Council under Article 49(2). Such recourse
may have the effect of transforming a legal dispute, decided by the Court
in accordance with existing law, into an issue to be settled a new by the
Council according to political principles.”
In these circumstances it would be the quintessence of irony to have only
a legal definition of aggression, the interpretation of which may not even
by determined by a juridical tribunal, and if determined, not enforced by
it. A legal definition would acquire empirical utility only when the
International Court assumes an exclusive jurisdiction over all disputes
without exception and reservation. However, the international community
will have to traverse quite a distance to reach this destination. That
would be the first effective step to the super-state as it may be called
in a legal sense, and not merely in the language of demagogic
politics.
It would, therefore, be a melancholy defeat of the object of defining
aggression if we were to try it at the present moment, at a time when it
is not possible. It would mean the application of double standards to all
international issues and the cruel incarceration of law by politics.
Hence, my delegation fears that under the existing conditions of
International Law, it is not possible to have a legal definition of
aggression. It is only possible to have to political definition. Of
course, it can be called legal but in effect, it will have a political
connotation, emphasis, and outlook.
Even if my delegation were to concede that a legal definition is possible
in a juridical sense, we would still be far away from the solution of the
problem. We would immediately encounter a crisis of words, and get
involved in a interminable semantic warfare. There would be disagreement
on the scope, content, and function of the definition. Should it be in
strict conformity with Article 51, or should it be a more comprehensive
definition in which the expression “armed attack” as used in Article 51 is
merely one from of aggression? Clarification and agreement will also be
needed on Article 39 of the Charter, which speaks of “act of aggression”.
Would an “act of aggression” mean an armed attack only or would it mean
aggression direct and indirect, aggression as envisaged by the Soviet
draft resolution, in document A/C 6/L/399? A rigid and a limited
definition may well defeat the object of defining aggression, and, on the
other hand, an all-embracing definition including “aggressive intent”,
“the notion of indirect aggression”, “the notion of economic aggression”,
“ideological aggression”, and other forms of indirect aggression may
create an anomalous state of affairs in which aggression may become a
regular and normal feature of human conduct and thereby lose its
dreadfully abnormal, fearful, and emergent meaning. From an abnormal
notion it would be turned into a natural notion. This half-exhausted
twentieth century is in the grips of the most dramatic ideological battle.
In every part of the world there is a clash of ideas, ideas that cannot be
easily controlled or liquidated. In so pregnant a setting ideological
aggression can be detected in almost every are of the globe. Normalcy
would be characterized by the word aggression if ideological aggression
were to form a part of it. However, basically, a definition whether narrow
or broad is without an obol of doubt, explosively loaded with far-reaching
implications, and is fraught with a host of dangers.
Assuming a definition is possible, is it desirable? A definition’s
immediate effect would be to stultify and hamper the progressive growth of
International Law. In this respect, my delegation noted with approval the
distinguished representative of Ceylon’s reference to the Law of Torts,
when he made his lucid statement during the course of the discussion on
the Report of the International Law Commission.
Because of the enormous dichotomy in the degree of centralization, the
only branch of Municipal Law that can be profitably compared with
International Law is the Law of Torts. Like General International Law, the
Law of Torts is in a stage of dynamic growth. If the Law of Torts had been
codified at a premature juncture, an irreparable harm would have been done
to the province of jurisprudence as a whole. The Tort of Negligence would
not have emerged and bloomed to its fullness. Out of the historic judgment
of Lord Atkin in Donohue v. Stevenson emerged not only a Tort of
Negligence but also a philosophy of law establishing beyond all reasonable
doubt, the virtue of undefined norms. “The categories of negligence are
never closed”, said the sagacious law Lord, and so it truly was; with the
result that redress and relief is now readily available to all who suffer
and groan physically and financially for the negligence of their fellow
citizens. If the Law of Torts had been stultified and cramped within the
four walls of a definition, it would not have been possible for thousands
of individuals to seek and receive relief according to their due. And
certainly it would not have been possible for the distinguished
representative of India to extend the Principle of the General Duty of
Care to the ambit of International Law and argue, as he rightly did, that
the principle enunciated in Donohue v. Stevenson imposes a duty of care on
every state in its international conduct.
The virtue of undefined legal terms has been well described by an eminent
American authority and to summarize the thought of my delegation in this
respect, it would perhaps be beneficial to quote an extract from the
Supreme Court’s decision in Davidson v. Board of Administrators of the
City of New Orleans (96. U.S. 97 1878 p.103, 104) for in this case the
Supreme Court expressed its reluctance to define the exact meaning of the
term “ Due Process” for much the same reasons that compel us to shy away
from a definition of aggression. I now quote the relevant passage:
-
“… if, therefore,
it were possible to define what it is for a State to deprive a person of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law, in terms which
would cover every exercise of power thus forbidden to the State, and
exclude those which are not, no more useful construction could be
furnished by this or any other court to any part of the fundamental law.
But, apart from the imminent risk of a failure to give any definition
which would be at once perspicuous, comprehensive and satisfactory, there
is wisdom … in the ascertaining of the intent and application of such an
important phase in the Federal Constitution, by the gradual process of
judicial inclusion and exclusion, as the cases presented for decision
shall require…”
If it is wise to keep the door open for the development of law in the
highly centralized system of Municipal Law by avoiding a priori
definitions, how much more wise and beneficial it would be to emulate this
policy in the highly decentralized system of International Law. Are we so
certain, so dogmatically committed to the belief that the categories of
aggression are closed and therefore fit for definition?
Those nurtured in the system of the Common Law have seen through
experience the inherent weaknesses of defined terms. It is true that even
in countries where the Common Law prevails, the dictates of modern society
have compelled to some extent the codification of laws. No effort has,
however, been made to codify laws that are in the process of development.
The Common Law countries present an excellent opportunity for judging
simultaneous and side by side the workings of both codified and uncodified
laws in one legal framework. Suffice it to say that codification gives
rise to a host of new problems, particularly those pertaining to
interpretation. Most certainly it is no automatic machine that produces
the required results on the insertion of the proper coin. At times not
infrequent it gives rise to problems far more complicated and difficult
that those that existed prior to codification.
Law is a coercive order. This is a characteristic of law recognized from
time immemorial. Without the element of force, law is reduced to naught,
instead of maintaining order it becomes a part of anarchy, For this very
reason it is not infrequently asked if International Law is true law. If
International Law possesses the ingredients of coercion, it is true law;
if it can take effective remedial and prohibitive sanctions against civil
and criminal delicts, it is true law. As the distinguished Representative
of Colombia so aptly said, and I quote. “There could be no society without
law, and no law without penalties”.
Those who regard International Law as true law consider that the most
effective and potent sanction of International Law is WAR, both defensive
and aggressive. According to the protagonists of this school of thought,
the theory of bellum justum is an inextricable part of
International Law. My delegation does not express any views on the merits
of this theory. We only say that it is necessary to reckon with this
theory and its manifold implications, if we are to define and declare
aggression an international crime. A situation may arise, as has happened
so often in the past, calling for the application of this doctrine. The
theory of Just War is not confined to the right of self-defense.
Aggressive collective action is conceivable. “Counter-war” is the only
effective reaction against an unpermitted war. If war is a delict, counter
war must be a sanction. The theory of bellum justum fell into
eclipse during the era of unbridled and unfettered national sovereignty.
But, once again, it is reasserting itself in the field of International
Law. So argue those who subscribe to this theory. They also say that it
forms the basis of many important landmarks in Positive International Law,
such as the Peace Treaty of Versailles, the Covenant of the League of
Nations, and the Kellogg Pact. It is even traceable in Article 51 of the
Charter.
This doctrine creates complications of very great magnitude not so much in
the exercise of legitimate self-defense measures but when aggression,
technically so-called, becomes necessary or is thought necessary as a
sanction of International Law. History is studded with a plethora of cases
that blur the line between measures of self-defense and unmitigated
aggression. Legitimate exercise of the right of self-defense and
aggression are concomitantly interwoven. The latest instance of this is
epitomized in the Korean conflict. Each party accused the other of
aggression and each claimed that it was exercising the inherent right of
self-defense, although aggression was so manifestly clear that the United
Nations were able to take peremptory measures.
A situation may arise in which State A accuses State B of organizing or
encouraging the organization of armed bands within its territory or of
subversive infiltration and on this pretence, in the exercise of its
inherent right of self-defense, attacks and subdues State B. In such an
event, the victim may appeal to another state or states, either under
treaty obligations or under the rules of General International Law, to
comes to its rescue. Interference by other states withstanding; the
intervention would be a just resort to counter-aggression against State
A.
The distinguished Representative of Colombia has stated, as an instance of
indirect aggression against France and the United Kingdom, the German
attack on Poland in 1939. This may be one interpretation of the chain of
events that unleashed the Second World War. The proponents of the doctrine
of bellum justum would, however interpret the declaration of war by
the United Kingdom on Nazi Germany as an act of just aggression against a
violator of International Law.
It may be argued that under prevailing conditions, a state cannot abuse
its right of self-defense beyond a given limit. The latter part of Article
51 of the Charter would be an effective bar against the abuse. This
argument, if advanced, would be found wanting in actual practice. For, in
such a contingency, the veto right may have the opposite effect. Instead
of preventing action, or counter-action, if would thwart the cessation of
hostilities, once hostilities have started in the case of an abused
exercise of the right of self-defense.
In view of the possibility of the occurrence of such abuses under the
existing conditions of International Law and without a radical amendment
or revision of the Charter, is it really desirable to classify aggression
as an international crime? A crime forbidding counter-aggression on
occasions when civilized nations are bound ethically and legally to
fulfill their solemn obligations of individual and collective action
against the misdeeds of a naked aggressor, an aggressor who vainly and
shamelessly seeks to conceal his aggression behind the façade of the
abused right of self-defense. International Law would be relegated to a
set of empty norms if it’s most effective coercive sanction is so
circumscribed.
Hence, it is my delegation’s concerted view that at this rather critical
juncture, it is neither possible nor desirable to define aggression.
Furthermore, we believe that we have the machinery, competent, capable,
and mobile enough to take appropriate corrective action against aggressive
acts, against other breaches of the peace, the threats to the peace, and
all other disputes and situations endangering international peace and
security, without defining aggression. On the contrary, a definition may
quite conceivably act as a barrier against quick and decisive
counter-action, and bog down the proceedings of the Security Council by a
prolonged and futile discussion on the niceties of interpreting facts. As
a definition would inevitably entail a drastic revision and amendment of
the Charter, perhaps it may be more opportune to explore the possibility
and necessity of a definition at the time when the revision of the Charter
comes up for consideration.
My delegation has voiced its apprehensions vis-à-vis the
possibility and desirability of defining aggression. However, as Pakistan
is incontrovertibly dedicated to the cause of peace, it is a fundamental
tenet of our policy to approach all issues impartially. My delegation does
not harbor any preconceived prejudices. Issues of such paramount
importance cannot be tracked in a dogmatic and doctrinaire manner. We have
indicated the more apparent, or what may appear to us to be the more
apparent, impediments in the path of a definition. But if even one out of
this galaxy of jurists is able to dispel our doubts, we are quite prepared
to examine sympathetically and objectively the suggestions and proposals
made to that effect. Society is composed of far too many imponderables for
there to be a finality of decision on such questions.
However, with this qualification my delegation must state categorically
that despite the fast changing pattern of human activity, there are
certain immutable factors. My delegation is fully aware of the character
and function of this committee albeit it cannot be denied that on
occasions the terms of reference of the various committees overlap. The
question under consideration is not exclusively a legal issue. That it is
part legal and part political is an incontestable proposition. If it were
strictly a legal issue it would not have caused so much perplexity. By its
very nature, it brings to the fore political and even socio-economic
problems. But even strictly legal issues involve the legitimate discussion
of facts. However, in deference to the apparent sense and feeling of this
Committee, my delegation will state in general terms a matter of
fundamental concern to my country.
If there is a generally acceptable definition of aggression, if we are to
close the categories of aggression, that definition must include economic
aggression. In this respect, paragraph 3(a) and (c) of the Soviet draft
resolution is not specific enough to dispel the fears of my delegation. If
we are to adopt a definition, then that definition must contain a separate
article on economic aggression stating clearly and unambiguously that
economic aggression or indirect aggression is perpetrated if lower
riparian’s are deprived of their natural rights in use of rivers which
flow through two or more countries. My delegation cannot overstate the
importance of this issue.
An armed attack is gruesome and odious because of the damage in inflicts.
Hence, everyone agrees that an armed attack is aggression, pure and
simple. If more devastating and deadly damage to life and property can be
inflicted without an armed attack, without the use of force, by means far
more callous and perfidious, then such means must constitute a part of
aggression as much as an armed attack.
If there is any interference in the normal and assured supply of
irrigation waters, my country would face the threat of total annihilation.
It would be the most invidious form of aggression. It would turn green
alluvial and fertile fields into a scorching desert. It would create
wide-spread famine, frustration, and fear. It would make it virtually
impossible for any authority to control civil strife and bloodshed.
Starvation would compel civilized human beings to resort to cannibalism.
It would shatter all concepts of decency and morality. This indeed would
be the outcome of such an aggression.
This is a situation not peculiar to my country. There are other states
that, due to their geographical position and their economic reliance on
supply of irrigation waters from an international river must take
cognizance of such a form of aggression.
Economic blockade of land-locked countries may, likewise, have similar
results and, therefore, my delegation will support the proposal of the
distinguished Representative of Afghanistan made in this connection
provided there is a generally acceptable definition of aggression and
provided on merit, my country’s great neighbors recognize our legitimate
fears and are prepared to admit that violation of riparian rights can
cause as much if not more economic havoc as an economic blockade of a
land-locked country. There could be no better demonstration of my
delegation’s bona fides than this voluntary acceptance of facts based on
merits.
I have taxed a great deal of your time and patience but before I close I
must appeal to you, my distinguished colleagues, that we must strive
tirelessly and continuously for the search of the necessary political
equilibrium and adjustments guaranteeing the maintenance of perpetual
peace. This is a duty we owe not only to our own war sick generation, but
to our progeny. We are impounded by our Charter not only to save
ourselves, but also the succeeding generations from the scourge and
carnage of war. I have often heard it said that in the event of world
conflagration, there will be neither victor nor vanquished. This seems
obvious, but even if there is a sham and farcical victory, it will be that
of the dying over the dead, and the dying will have the dubious thrill of
glory by witnessing the utter demolition of civilization; the destruction
of our homes and universities, our centers of art and science, our mosques
and temples and churches, our Taj Mahals and Westminster Abbeys; and among
the wailing of orphaned infants and crippled widows, the victors will
breathe their last breath. So it is our sacred duty to work for a lasting
peace and to give a ring of reality and not merely that of hope to the
words of an English poet who visualized the day –
“… when the war
drums beat no longer and the battle flags are furled, in a Parliament
of Man, in a federation of the World…”
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