This nation, born in the midst of crisis has, during the last fifteen years of its existence, witnessed many emergencies. But I submit that the emergency through which it is now passing is, perhaps, the gravest it has had to face.
Our foreign policy is being subjected today to rethinking and reappraisal. This is because of certain internal developments in the political life of the country and certain external developments set in motion by some major decisions of the big Powers in relation to the sub-continent.
During the past years, there have been occasions when there was a demand for the reformulation of our foreign policy. As is well known, some political parties and schools of political thought in Pakistan were not reconciled to the foreign policy that had been adopted for the country. However, on those occasions the compulsive force of the developments of which I have spoken was absent and consequently no change of policy took place. Today, we are confronted with not only the arguments of the dissenters for a revision of our foreign policy, reinforced by our experience of the past decade but also the impact of the events of the last few months. We are thus compelled to reconsider Pakistan’s basic position in international affairs.
The searching re-examination through which we are going might well lead to a metamorphosis in our national life. For that reason I would urge the House to be good enough to concede the Government’s request to limit the discussion to the fundamentals of our foreign policy and not to go into the details of its various problems. These problems are at present being identified and reappraised by the Government. Only last November, we bad in this House a long and exhaustive debate on external affairs, when every aspect of them was discussed. In the Dacca session, the House had yet another opportunity of debating our foreign relations. The present position is but a continuation of the emergency that arose last October. The events that have since taken place are a logical sequel of the crisis which was precipitated in the sub-continent by the Sino-Indian conflict and the decision of the Western Powers to extend massive military aid to India. Thus, the situation which we are facing today is basically the same as that, which we faced in October and November, 1962. Moreover, all the events which have since taken place are known to the House. The emergency which existed at that time was debated in a secret session. The House had also the opportunity of hearing the President of Pakistan. In consequence, the members of the Assembly are sufficiently well informed on the thinking of the Government and the Government is similarly informed on the thinking of the country. Nor is there any need to repeat all the arguments that can be presented in favour of or against the foreign policy of Pakistan.
As I said in my opening remarks, the present threat to the national security and territorial integrity of Pakistan is by no means the first one in its experience. We have had to face crisis after crisis from the very day that our country came into existence, all because of India’s unfortunate antagonism. The fact that India has been enabled by the Western Powers to augment its military strength to a most formidable extent has made the situation even more disturbing and dangerous. This augmentation is being brought about through the assistance principally of the United States of America and the United Kingdom, with both of whom we are associated in defence alliances. This is the new element which has been injected into the situation and which aggravates it.
During the last fifteen years, India has embarked on a course of aggression on no less than five occasions. This indeed is a record which any aggressor state, in the history of the world, might well envy. On a number of occasions, the Prime Minister of India, his cabinet colleagues, the Ministers of provincial governments in India and the leaders of political parties in that country have made statements naming Pakistan as India’s Enemy Number One. This declaration of enmity was repeated even during the Sino-Indian fighting by officials and other responsible spokesmen of the Government of India. Such is the position which India has taken up in relation to Pakistan.
However, notwithstanding the professions of peaceful intent and of pacific policies by India, in actual fact, India is an aggressor state. Therefore, when India is arming itself feverishly, as she is at present, we cannot look upon it with equanimity. The situation which has thus been created is a grave one. It poses for us a threat, to counter which we need all our resources and strength.
This situation is not of our making. On the contrary, we have been doing everything in our power to prevent the developments that have led to it. However, it was beyond our capacity to prevent them. In the Sino-Indian conflict are involved the two largest states of the East. We can do little to influence the course of the conflict between them, much less to bring about its termination.
We have told the Western Powers repeatedly that the augmentation of India’s military strength is directed principally against Pakistan, to whose separate existence as a nation India has not really reconciled itself. We have adduced proof of this fact by inviting attention to India’s past conduct as an aggressor state and to the utterances of responsible Indian leaders, betraying their aggressive intentions towards our country. We have reminded the Western Powers of the fact that the history of the sub-continent over a period of more than eight hundred years is the history of conflict between its two major communities. That conflict which at times took the form of war has continued after the partition. The Kashmir dispute has magnified it and aggravated the mutual suspicions and fears which bedevil relations between Pakistan and India.
Unfortunately, we and the Western Powers proceed on different basic assumptions. Their assumption is that, in the twentieth century, a state like India cannot embark on aggression against Pakistan and that the United Nations is there to prevent aggression and to cope with warlike crises anywhere in the world. The Western Powers also claim that they themselves can control the use of the arms given by them to India, so that they are not used against Pakistan. Further they have given us an assurance to the effect that if India embarks on aggression against us, they will come to our assistance. They consider that the Government and the people of Pakistan should be satisfied with this assurance as a guarantee of this country’s security and independence.
We think otherwise. In the first place, history gives abundant proof of the fact that in any given situation it is difficult to determine who the aggressor is. It will be even more difficult now if modem weapons are used. It will not be possible to prove which party committed the first act that is to be classed as aggression, which party was the first to fire the shot and whether the first shot was fired in aggression or in self-defence. The United Nations, and the International Law Commission and, before them, the League of Nations, were seized with the problem of defining aggression. But no definition of it has yet been found. There is nothing more important for a sovereign state than actually to prevent aggression against itself, for after one’s homes and cities have been destroyed, there is not much that can be done about it. The augmentation of India’s military strength through the United States and the United Kingdom aid has given rise to a situation in which the threat to our security is being menacingly intensified and compounded.
Furthermore, India is in a position to sell its own products for money and with that money to purchase armaments from countries other than the United States and the United Kingdom. This in itself is a cause of alarm for Pakistan. And, of course, there are India’s own resources of arms and the substantial military assistance it is receiving from the Soviet Union. It is poor consolation to be told that if aggression is committed against Pakistan by India, the United States will come to Pakistan’s assistance. But after aggression has taken place, with its concomitant loss of life and destruction of property, that will be meaningless.
The same assurance was given to India when the United States embarked on an arms aid programme to Pakistan. It might be recalled that at that time, the boot was on India’s leg, and India had put forward the same arguments to discount the assurance that the United States would come to its assistance if it were attacked by Pakistan. But the assurance given to Pakistan is different in one sense. This difference arises from the fact that Pakistan is in every respect a far smaller country than India. Even if we make every possible sacrifice, with our resources and with the aid that we might get, we would still not be able to match India’s resources or India’s intrinsic strength. The best we could do would be to try and maintain some sort of a precarious balance. The reason is that India has over four times of Pakistan’s population, territory, economic wealth and technical skill. Therefore, while the assurance given to India by the United States was quite superfluous that given to Pakistan is of little or no value in a situation in which our security is in jeopardy.
This point of view, which represents our genuine apprehension, has been made fully known both to the United States and the United Kingdom. They, however, feel that their global interests and policies require the containment of international Communism. They argue that these same considerations formed the basis of Western economic and military assistance to Pakistan. In view of their global policy and their belief that there is a real threat to India they regard it as necessary for them to give military assistance to India. They even claim that had it not been for Pakistan’s objections and fears, heir assistance to India would have been on a much larger scale. As it is, they say, the aid given to India is limited in quantity and defensive in character.
The agreement reached at Nassau was to the effect that the United States and the United Kingdom would offer military assistance to India of the value of 120 million dollars. A few months later, on 30th June, a joint communiqué was issued by President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan announcing their further decision to give long term military assistance to India over and above that which had already been provided for under the Nassau Agreement. We are not yet in a position to inform the House about the exact scope and nature of this latest agreement, for its terms has not been disclosed to us. When they are, we shall, should the need and the opportunity for it arise during the session, announce them in the House, or inform the nation of them through the Press.
I have stated that in spite of our best efforts, we have not been able to dissuade the United States and the United Kingdom from taking the decision to give long term military assistance to India. It may be that under that decision the aid will be limited in quantity or that it will be of a defensive character. However, let me say that we find no satisfaction in the assurance that the aid will be of a limited, controllable and defensive character, for we know that these are fatuous qualifications. In practical and pragmatic terms, they are meaningless.
This being the position, how then can Pakistan safeguard its independence and territorial integrity? We have been told that in the twentieth century it is not possible for a state to embark on naked aggression against another, such as ours, with its population of one hundred million. We have replied that this argument is not a tenable one. Even if it be assumed that India will not be in a position to embark on wholesale aggression against Pakistan, the situation between the two countries will still further deteriorate, for India will have been put in such a position as to be able to dictate to a neighbouring country from a position of strength.
India’s bargaining position will thus be artificially increased to such an extent as will preclude, for all time, the possibility of its agreeing to a settlement on any except its own inequitable terms with a country which is militarily its inferior. The issue thus is not only that India is receiving military assistance, which may be used against Pakistan, but also that the augmentation of India’s military strength invests it with a most dangerous power of dictating its own terms in its disputes with other states. That too is a matter which we have to consider very seriously. Time is running out. With the passage of time, as the military and economic strength of India increases, the possibilities of its agreeing to a peaceful and reasonable settlement of our outstanding disputes with it are correspondingly reduced.
I have mentioned the important development that followed the November crisis. When we agreed to negotiations with India over the Kashmir problem, we had said that it was necessary for the Western Powers to link up military assistance to India with an honorable settlement on Kashmir. Now there should be no misunderstanding about it. It was not that we were trying to take advantage of the situation that had been created for India. In terms of political realism and morality our plea was justifiable and righteous. We were making a request which, if agreed to, would have yielded positive and substantial results. We were not linking our problems or disputes with the problems or disputes of India with any other country. All that we were doing was to link, as history had already linked, the grave issue of happiness or misery for the Kashmiri people with that of peace or war in our area. If there had been a settlement of the Kashmir problem on an honorable and equitable basis that would have provided a great opportunity for the pursuit of peaceful policies in the entire sub-continent. Such a settlement would have released new energies and opened up new paths of mutual co-operation between the peoples of Pakistan and India. But unfortunately, India was not serious about a Kashmir settlement.
India did not really fear Chinese aggression, for it knew, as did the rest of us, that the conflict with China was no more than a border clash, brought about by India’s own impetuosity. That being the position, what India really wanted was to augment its military strength and potential to be directed, not so much against Communist China, as against the country which it had declared to be its Enemy Number One. Today we are faced with a delicate situation which might lead us to the threshold of a new phase of our national history. This situation is engaging the most serious attention of the Government. This much we know and can say that if. God forbid, we should be involved in a clash with India, that is if India were, in its frustration to turn its guns against Pakistan, the international position being what it is, Pakistan would not be alone.
That conflict would not involve Pakistan only. An attack by India on Pakistan would no longer confine the stakes to the independence and territorial integrity of Pakistan. An attack by India on Pakistan would also involve the security and territorial integrity of the largest state in Asia. This new factor that has arisen is a very important one. I would not, at this stage, wish to elucidate it any further. It would suffice to say that the national interests of another state would be involved in an Indian attack on Pakistan because that state and other states know about India’s aggressive intentions and know that India is capable of embarking on aggression against other countries. Therefore, a defeated Pakistan or a subjugated Pakistan would not only mean annihilation for us but also pose a serious threat to other countries of Asia and particularly to the largest state of Asia. From that point of view and as a result of the other international factors that have recently come into operation, I think I can confidently say that every thing is being done by the Government to see that our national interests and territorial integrity are safeguarded and protected.
At the same time, I would like to say that in spite of the grave crisis that we face, we should not feel alarmed to the point of permitting any sort of moral imbalance to develop in our national life. Our people will face the present crisis, as they have faced all crises in the past, with calmness and dignity,
The United States has declared that the military assistance which Pakistan has received from it is not to be used against India and that similarly the military assistance which India is receiving from it is not to be used against Pakistan. The United States maintains that just as the arms given by it to Pakistan arc so controlled that they cannot be used by Pakistan against India, it will be ensured that the arms given by it to India will not be used against Pakistan. Even though I have expressed my doubts about its efficacy, this guarantee exists. This fact is not without importance in the context of the present situation.
The question now is that of maintaining a military balance between Pakistan and India in order to prevent a conflict in the subcontinent. In view of the arms build-up in India, it becomes incumbent upon Pakistan to increase its own military strength. The argument that the United States does not give military assistance to Pakistan to be used against India is no longer valid. If military assistance to India is controllable so that it cannot be used against Pakistan, further augmentation of Pakistan’s military strength, in order to assure a balance, need not be regarded as directed against India, for additional military assistance to Pakistan should also be capable of being controlled. It is imperative that in the interest of peace there should be a military balance between India and Pakistan and an assurance that this balance will not be upset so that neither state becomes capable of embarking on aggression against the other.
We have in the past experienced many vicissitudes in our relations with the Western Powers. For the present deterioration in our relations with them, we are not responsible, any more than we are responsible for the developments which have led to it. It is for the Western Powers to arrest this deterioration. It is for them to act in such a manner as to assure the security of Pakistan and the inviolability of its political, economic and social systems.
The House particularly wishes to be informed on the question Of our negotiations with India over Kashmir. I should like to take this opportunity to make a brief statement about them. The discussion at our first meeting at Rawalpindi was confined to a preliminary examination of the points of view of India and Pakistan, in particular of the issues involved in the dispute as India saw them. At Delhi, where we had the second round of talks, we pressed further our contention that the only honorable method of solving the Kashmir problem was that the people of Kashmir should decide their own future. In the third round of talks we continued to press for a plebiscite under the aegis of the United Nations. India raised various objections to the procedure of a plebiscite, whether an overall one or a limited one. It was in the course of this round that the Indians gave us their proposal, which was none other than that which they had suggested in the past. It amounted to nothing more than a readjustment of the existing cease-fire line. They were reminded that, at the very outset, in the first round of talks in Rawalpindi, we had told them that if they were to put forward a proposal for a settlement on the basis of the cease-fire line, it would be wholly unacceptable to us, and that, therefore, any such proposal would not provide even a starting point for the discussions. Nonetheless, that was what the Indians put forward. Pakistan naturally rejected it. True, we were advised that this proposal should be regarded only as the beginning, that it should not be considered to represent India’s final position and that; therefore, we should persist in the negotiations.
In the fourth round, the issues were related not to Kashmir, but to the question of our boundary agreement with China. In the fifth round at Karachi, we reached a stalemate. It was apparent that India would not move forward at all. Thereafter, in the sixth and final round, we informed the Indian Delegation that in our view a plebiscite was the only honorable, practical and proper basis for a settlement of the Kashmir problem. We were quite willing that, for about one year, the Valley of Kashmir be put under international control, with the provision that, at the end of that period, to ascertain the wishes of its people, a plebiscite shall be held or their wishes ascertained through some other method and their future decided accordingly. This proposal, which we considered to be a fair one for an honorable and equitable settlement of the Kashmir dispute, was also rejected by India.
I might here mention that the proposal for a partial plebiscite which was first made by General McNaughton and then by Sir Owen Dixon had been favorably considered by past Governments of Pakistan. The only variation which we made in it was to limit the plebiscite to the Valley, whose future constitutes the crux of the problem. It is in the Valley that the majority of the people of the state live. We proposed that for a period of a year or so, I would say at the most a year or fifteen months, there should be some agency—an impartial international agency—to supervise and control the administration of the Valley and that this agency should be empowered to hold a plebiscite at the end of that period. This proposal was rejected by India as being in essence the same as the one which had been advocated by Pakistan in the past. It has often been asked whether there has been any advantage in having had these negotiations with India. I think history alone can be the judge of that question. But it is our view that Pakistan has definitely gained by entering into them. I shall briefly state the reasons for this view. First, as far as the United Nations was concerned, the problem of Kashmir had lost its urgency and importance. Moreover, the Soviet Union always exercised its veto whenever an attempt was made to get the Security Council to adopt an effective resolution on Kashmir. In the meantime, India had consolidated its position in Kashmir.
Furthermore, in the last ten years, India had built the fortress of its case on the assumption that there was no Kashmir problem, that Kashmir was an integral and inseparable part of India, that constitutionally, politically and economically, it was as much a part of India as any other of its provinces, that the Constituent Assembly of Kashmir had taken certain fundamental decisions as to the future of the state, that they had had three elections in Kashmir and that as far as the reality of international politics was concerned there was no such thing as a Kashmir dispute or a Kashmir problem. This view was put forward not only by India but was also advocated by certain important and powerful states, whose names are known to the members of this House. One of these states is so important as to have the right of veto in the Security Council. The recent negotiations are overwhelming evidence of the fact that the Kashmir problem continues to exist and that it is a major problem affecting international peace and security.
At the end of the negotiations in May, a communiqué was issued in which it was admitted by India that the negotiations did not result in the settlement of the Kashmir dispute. Thus the contention which had in the past been advanced by India and propagated throughout the world that there was no such thing as the problem of Kashmir has been debunked. That incidentally has caused some embarrassment to the great Power which had supported the Indian stand. Moreover there is evidence that in the view of the Indian Press and the Indian public opinion, if from these negotiations any benefit has accrued to any party, it has not accrued to India. We have lost nothing through them. On the contrary, I submit that we have gained. World attention has again been focused on the Kashmir dispute and its importance as an international issue has been highlighted. That importance will continue to be recognised until an honorable and equitable solution is found for it.
The members of the House also wish to be informed about the boundary agreement with China. On that matter, I beg to submit that in December 1960 we had decided to make a proposal to China for the demarcation of our undefined boundary with it. In February 1961, we entered into negotiations with that country. In March 1961 we made to it a formal request for a boundary agreement.
As a result, some preliminary exchanges of views on the subject took place, but no substantial progress was made. At that time India contended with the People’s Republic of China that Pakistan had no right to negotiate for that part of Kashmir, which, though under Pakistan’s physical control, was a part of the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir and legally a part of India, and that India was the only sovereign authority to negotiate a settlement of the boundary in question.
In support of this contention, India tried to muster the assistance of the Soviet Union and some other Powers. However, in spite of Indian demarches, our negotiations with China made satisfactory progress. The Sino-Indian conflict gave a fresh impetus to these negotiations. You can well understand the reason for it. No state would care to be confronted at the same time with problems or unresolved situations on two fronts. Be that as it may, we were the gainers by entering into negotiations to delimit our boundary with China. We saw no reason to delay the conclusion of an agreement about it, for we ourselves had initiated the negotiations. The late Mr. Mohammed Ali of Bogra was to go to the People’s Republic of China to conclude the agreement. Most unfortunately, he did not live to do so, and I had to go in his place. We came to a speedy and satisfactory settlement of the boundary. Under this settlement, Pakistan gained about 750 square miles of territory, some of it rich in natural resources, particularly the salt mines of Oprang, which the people of Hunza and the surrounding territory consider necessary for their needs and for their economic well being. It is a matter of the greatest importance that through this agreement we have removed any possibility of friction on our only common border with the People’s Republic of China. We have eliminated what might well have be- come a source of misunderstanding and of future troubles.
As far as Afghanistan is concerned, you know that for a number of years our relations with that country had been going from bad to worse. I should not like now to go into the question why those relations deteriorated. I would only submit that it was not at our initiative that there was a break in them. It was Afghanistan which about two years ago severed diplomatic relations with Pakistan.
This was sad and painful for us, for Afghanistan is a neighbor of ours and a Muslim country. Because of these facts, we have always desired to have with it the best of relations. This year, due to the initiative of the Shahinshah of Iran, who made strenuous efforts in this respect, we entered into negotiations for the resumption of diplomatic and trade relations with Afghanistan. These negotiations which took place in Teheran were most fruitful. As a consequence, I am happy to inform the House that we shall in the near future be sending an Ambassador to Kabul. The person we have chosen for this post is an outstanding man, possessed of military and diplomatic experience. He has been a General in our army and has held important ambassadorial assignments. This person is General Yusuf, who at present is our High Commissioner in the United Kingdom. He will go to Kabul as soon as possible.
As I have said, it is our cherished desire to have normal, indeed friendly, relations with all countries, particularly with such of them as are our neighbours. We have no ill-will or animosity towards any of them. We wish to live in peace, in mutual understanding and friendship with all countries. In the achievement of this objective we have fully succeeded, except in so far as only one state is concerned. That state is India.
We have always advocated the method of negotiation for settling disputes and resolving problems, as we did with China. If you agree to peaceful methods of settlement of disputes, you must also agree to the principle of give and take. That being so, especially when the two negotiating states are neighbours and on friendly terms, what is important is not any one part or aspect of the negotiations between them but their cumulative outcome, their total effect on the entirety of a situation. When in order to resolve a dispute, you enter into meaningful negotiations, you cannot precede on the basis of take it or leave it, for that can only result in a breakdown of the talks. If this proposition is not accepted by my friends of the Opposition, then there is no purpose and no point in the Government entering into any negotiations to resolve any dispute.
I said that we had gained 750 square miles of territory from the People’s Republic of China. Has that not been a real gain for us? And China, too, did not lose on the whole. In fact, it gained in the sense that it came to a settlement over the question of the boundary with Pakistan, hitherto an undefined boundary. The settlement laid the foundation for normal and good neighborly relations. After all what is our objective? If the objective is to seek the good of our own country and also to seek the good of the world at large, then it can be achieved only through such settlements as the one we have arrived at with China. Our aim is to have the most friendly and peaceful relations with as many countries as possible. I am happy to be able to say that our endeavors in pursuit of that aim have yielded good results. We have arrived at the boundary settlement with the People’s Republic of China; so that we should have a peaceful and harmonious relationship with that great country and that there should be no cause for misunderstanding or friction over our common boundary. We have resumed diplomatic relations with Afghanistan, a Muslim country, so that we should be able to live with it in peace, amity and good neighborliness. We have settled outstanding issues with Iran, the country with whom we have always had the friendliest of relations. We have sorted out our differences with Burma and it is hoped that, before the end of the year, the President of the Revolutionary Council of Burma will visit Pakistan. We have greatly improved our relations with Nepal, a fact highlighted by the visit of our President to that country. We recently had the honour of having the President of Indonesia in our midst. This has been most satisfactory in that it has led to the consolidation of our relations with Indonesia, a Muslim country of a hundred million people. With Ceylon, too, we have good friendly relations. On the invitation of its Government, our President will pay a visit to Ceylon this year. With the Philippines and Thailand, which are our allies, we have the most amicable and cordial relations.
Thus, we are on good terms with all our neighbours, near or distant, except India. India is on bad terms not only with us but also with almost all its other neighbours. The arrogant attitude of the Government of India and its refusal to adopt a spirit of conciliation in its dealings with neighbouring countries has brought about a situation which is most unfortunate and undesirable for Pakistan as well as for other countries. I would not like to name those countries. They are known to the members of the House. We know what kind of relations India has with its neighbor Pakistan its neighbor the People’s Republic of China and its other neighbours. The whole world knows it. How is it that all countries, except India, can, on a basis of mutual understanding, achieve a settlement of their differences with others? Why cannot India? That country stands out as the great exception amongst those that arc seeking to bring about understanding, tranquility and peace in this region and in the world.
Recently there have been negotiations for an Air Service Agreement between Pakistan and China. There have been references to this matter in the press. This Agreement is likely to be of great commercial importance for us. It will reduce the air distance between Pakistan and Japan by three to four hours. Correspondingly it will also reduce the distance of nights from other parts of the world passing through Pakistan to Tokyo.
In order to be able to extend PIA services to Tokyo, we had asked for landing rights in Hong Kong. Unfortunately these rights were not granted to us. We had, therefore, to ask for landing rights in the territory of the People’s Republic of China. Those rights having been granted, we should now be able to take our air network around the world. I should mention for the information of the House that other countries have also asked for transit rights through the People’s Republic of China for their airlines and are ready to negotiate with it for them.
Before I resume my seat, I should like to say that we realize that the situation with which we are faced is a grave one. We know that the days ahead are going to be difficult. I wish to assure the House that we are making every effort to resolve the situation and to ward off danger to our national security. In this endeavour, we need the co-operation of the representatives of the nation here in this Assembly and in the Provincial Assemblies. At this juncture, nothing -can be a greater source of strength to the Government than the support of the people. We know that they appreciate the magnitude of the crisis confronting the country. We believe that they can and will help their Government to surmount it. We should not like to see a deterioration of our relations with the Western Powers. However, it is not for us to take the initiative in this matter, because we are the injured party; we are the ones who have cause to feel concerned. It is for them to take the necessary measures—and these measures can be taken—to bring about a change in the situation which would be in the interest of our mutual relations.
As far as the question of Kashmir is concerned, it remains the most important, indeed, the basic issue in Pakistan’s foreign policy. This issue is responsible for the great gulf that divides us and India. It constitutes a grave problem for the world. Although we have a great stake in it, the stake of the Kashmiris is the greatest of all. It is nothing short of a tragedy that they are being denied their right of self-determination. In fact they are the only people in this region who still suffer under a colonial regime and an oppressive regime at that. Today, the people of Kashmir are being called up to contribute to the war effort of India. They have no concern at all with the so-called threat to India or with the armed conflict in which India is involved. Kashmir is not a part of India.
Finally, I should like to say on behalf of the Government that we are looking forward to this debate on foreign policy. I wish to express the hope that after the members have spoken, I shall be afforded an opportunity to elucidate the position of the Government on the points raised by them.